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Introduction
 Japanese foreign trade was started by European and American general trading 
companies just after Japan had opened its ports at the end of the Edo period and 
before the start of the Meiji period. In this paper, we focus particularly on Kobe 
and examine the Chinese compradors, who had close relationships with Chinese 
trading firms; these firms followed a unique path of development, wherein they 
had either a mutual dependency on, or antagonistic relationships, with the 
European trading companies. The compradors discussed herein are all narrowly 
defined, and do not include merchants that performed the function of compradors, 
or those doing similar tasks1).
 Recent years have seen noteworthy studies on expatriate Chinese in Kobe, 
including those on the activities of compradors; one of them was based on an 
approach from economic history. Detailed empirical analyses have been conducted 
in the studies by Naoto Kagotani and Kazuko Furuta; further, there are 
numerous primary sources of that time that include studies on the role of expa-
triate Chinese in the port of Kobe, and the formation of economic networks 
 † This is a product of research which was financially supported by Kansai University Fund for 
Supporting Young Scholars, 2018 “Relations Between Chinese Merchants and International 
Banks in Kobe”.
 †† Kansai University, Faculty of Economics
 1) There are numerous prior studies that cover the role of the comprador. Exceptional studies 
conducted during and after the second world war include research by Tadashi Negishi, as 
well as that by Naosaku Uchida and Shukei Go (Negishi 1948; Uchida 1949; Go 1944). 
Recently, Eiichi Motono published a detailed empirical study on the roles assumed by the 
English-speaking Chinese in Hong Kong and Shanghai. Research has progressed gone 
beyond the focus on compradors in the relationship between the Chinese and Western 
merchants during the nineteenth century (Motono 2004). Internationally, many acclaimed 
studies have been published on the role assumed by the comprador, particularly from a 
business history perspective (Yen-p‘ing Hao 1971; Wang 1993; Chan 2001; Cox, Huang Biao, 
and Metcalfe 2003; Smith 2016; Wilson and Yang 2016).
2between Shanghai and Kobe for cotton imports at the start of the Meiji period. 
Other studies have analysed the expatriate Chinese in Kobe from the perspectives 
of Japanese-Chinese relations and the policies of the then Chinese government on 
general affairs; still others have argued from the perspective of the period over 
which expatriate Chinese came to Kobe—primarily the perspective of limits placed 
on Chinese labourers in Japan. These studies have examined the historical role of 
expatriate Chinese in Kobe in every field. As has already been mentioned, this 
paper focuses on the activities of expatriate Chinese in Kobe, and particularly 
those of compradors.
 It is known that expatriate Chinese in Kobe settled there and formed an expa-
triate society while blending in with the local community, as is expressed in the 
phrase ‘settle down and take root (落地生根)’. This resulted in the expatriate 
Chinese acquiring a certain status in the economic circles of Kobe between the 
world wars, and the building of a close economic relationships between Japanese 
and Western firms; because of this, the role of expatriate Chinese as compradors 
became even more important as they strengthened economic ties between them-
selves and traders in East and Southeast Asia. In this paper, we narrow our focus 
to the 1930s, when economic relations between Kobe, on the one hand, and East 
and Southeast Asia, on the other, became stronger.
 The compradors themselves were employed by many Japanese firms and 
Western trading companies, each pursuing a different line of business. Among 
these businesses, compradors played a major role in banks, which had a particu-
larly significant overall presence in business. Thus, we focus our study on 
merchants that developed as compradors of banks, particularly of the Yokohama 
Specie Bank, which played a central role in foreign trade financing in 1930s 
Japan.
 Much research has already been done on the Yokohama Specie Bank, including 
its role in economic expansion during the interwar years; during the second world 
war as a government bank; its role in procuring wartime funds locally; and its role 
as a foreign exchange bank with the development of Japanese trade, including 
raw silk exports, with foreign countries from the Meiji period onwards to the start 
of the Showa period, among many others. However, there has been little research 
on the role of the Yokohama Specie Bank in Kobe; in particular, there seem to be 
no studies on 1930s Kobe. Thus, many questions remain as to how Chinese 
merchants acted as compradors in the Yokohama Specie Bank at the time. Using 
the few figures left behind by the Kobe branch of the bank, this paper provides, to 
a certain extent, empirical clarity on these questions.
Section 1  An Overview of Expatriate Chinese in Kobe
 Expatriate Chinese merchants are said to have built a base in Kobe, alongside 
western merchants, directly after Japan opened its ports at the end of the Edo 
period. There are no exact numbers, but according to a survey conducted by the 
3Hyogo Prefectural Office in December 1869 (the 2nd year of the Meiji period), 
there were approximately 300 individuals that had come to Kobe as Westerners’ 
employees, and who were operating their own businesses. Later, the number of 
Chinese living in Kobe increased, and except for the unavoidable repatriation of 
almost half of the Chinese population in Kobe during the Sino-Japanese War, the 
number of Chinese expatriates in Kobe kept growing between the Meiji and 
Taisho periods. According to available data, 516 Chinese lived in Kobe in 1880; 
this number continued to increase and touched 1,004 in 1894; 1,831 in 1912; and 
5,140 in 1924 (Kanda 1938 p.138 and 145)2).
 In addition, according to a 1936 survey, approximately 60 stores (the survey 
calls them “Chinese stores”) were operated by expatriate Chinese, with about 45 of 
those stores conducting a certain amount of trade. The maximum number of 
employees in a store was 14 and these stores together employed approximately 
500 people (Okazaki 1936 p.2). While this is the headcount of Chinese merchants 
in major stores, and only serves as a representative figure, we can surmise from it 
that Chinese merchants had secured a certain standing within Kobe’s economic 
circles. While there was a short-term decrease from the number at the start of the 
Meiji period, the Chinese population in Kobe followed a growing trend; this 
increase was likely owing to the status they enjoyed in Kobe business circles.
 Further, in terms of the business operations of Chinese merchants, few 
conducted businesses in small-sized stores in the middle of the Meiji period, while 
many were involved in housekeeping work or trade as employees of Western or 
wealthy Chinese merchants. Afterwards, with an increase in Chinese merchants, 
the number of stores and business firms gradually increased3). As a result, by 
1936, the size of Chinese businesses had grown large, and according to a survey 
by the Yokohama Specie Bank, the largest of them had capital of 300,000 yen, 
with regular businesses having capital of somewhere between 50,000 and 100,000 
yen. According to another report, many businesses in Kobe operated by the 
Chinese had been in business for 40–50 years, with Yù Zhēnxiáng, a native of 
Guangdong, having worked as a manager since 1899. Businesses had capital 
ranging from 10,000 to around 1,000,000, with an average of about 100,000 yen. 
As with the Yokohama Specie Bank, the report noted an improvement of the posi-
tion of the Chinese in Kobe. Thus, many of these expatriate Chinese were highly 
trusted merchants, and they generally worked as commission agents (Okazaki 
 2) As of 1883, women made up 22.5% of the total Chinese population living in Kobe. This figure 
grew to 40.0% in 1893. We observe that this period marked a transition in the social struc-
ture of the Chinese community in Kobe; from migrant workers, they became permanent 
residents. Additionally, we observe that males primarily immigrated to Kobe at a young age 
(25 years or younger). We infer that these settlers brought their wives or families over from 
their hometown/homeland once they became financially independent (Suwaki 1998 p.64).
 3) Suwaki found that these immigrants had settled into various occupations by the early Meiji 
period; these included operating pig slaughterhouses, running restaurants, and patrolling 
the community (Suwaki 1998 p.64)
41936 p.2)4).
Section 2  A History of the Expatriate Chinese in Kobe
 According to Kanda, the history of economic activity among the expatriate 
Chinese in Kobe can generally be divided into four stages. The first extended from 
the opening of Japan’s ports at the end of the Edo period to 1877; the second was 
from 1878 to 1889; the third was from 1890 to the end of the Meiji period (1911); 
and the fourth comprised the post-Meiji period. While the first period witnessed a 
small number of businesses operated by the Chinese merchants, such businesses 
were generally small and few in number. The second period, which started with 
the founding of a Qing consulate in 1878, saw powerful Chinese merchants come 
to Tokyo to grow their businesses, and the third period saw expanding trade 
between Kobe and China and Hong Kong; however, the drop in the status of 
compradors of Western trading firms owing to the Sino-Japanese war was 
followed by an expansion in imports and exports, particularly among Japanese 
trading firms, in the fourth period. Directly after this period, the ocean shipping 
industry came to be dominated by Japanese firms, such as Nippon Yusen. In the 
fourth period, Chinese trading in Kobe was battered by a campaign against 
Japanese currency. However, from World War I onwards, the number of Chinese 
individuals coming to Kobe to operate non-trade businesses increased, and the 
status of Chinese individuals in Kobe’s economic circles continued to grow (Kanda 
1938 pp.131-150)5).
 Expatriate Chinese played a large role in overseas trading in Kobe as soon as 
the ports opened. In particular, almost all Chinese trade transactions were 
handled by Chinese merchants6). Specifically, Chinese merchants had a particu-
 4) Chinese merchants based in Kobe were mainly from the Guangdong, Fujian, and Zhejiang 
provinces. Among these, Guangdong accounted for the largest share of merchants. These 
Chinese merchants created groups based on their hometown (member association/society：公
所) and built close relationships in various contexts that went beyond economic activities. 
Specifically, the Guangdong society was the most influential, having 39 members in 1936 
(4-5 pending applications) (Okazaki 1936 p.2)
 5) Pu Lan suggests that a more appropriate categorisation of Kanda’s method would be possible 
by using both the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars as boundaries to classify three 
time periods (the foundational period, the golden age, and the period of decline). He 
describes the foundational period as that extending from Japan’s re-establishment of foreign 
trade (1854) until the Sino-Japanese War; the golden age was the period from the Sino-
Japanese War until the Russo-Japanese War; and the period of decline was the period from 
the Russo-Japanese War until World War II (Pu Lan 1966 p.4-6).
 6) Japanese merchants who entered the Shanghai and Hong Kong markets in the late 19th 
century were unable to compete with Chinese merchants. Studies also indicate that Chinese 
merchants monopolised the China-Japan trade in all sectors, except for coal and copper. A 
prior report by the British Foreign Ministry in Kobe shows that the Chinese maintained 
close relationships with each other through blood and regional bonds. Additionally, the 
Chinese were successful because of their unity and cooperation in financing one another’s 
5larly large role in the exports of copper and Japanese tallow produced in Kyushu 
and northern Shikoku7). Further, exports of marine products from Kobe, such as 
sea cucumber and abalone, were pioneered by Chinese merchants, with similar 
efforts seen among Chinese merchants based on the Korean peninsula around the 
same time (Ishikawa 2016 chap.2). Chinese merchants had monopolised the trade 
of marine products in East Asia during the middle to latter half of the 19th 
century.
 From the descriptions of Kobe Kaiko 30-nenshi, we can surmise that Chinese 
merchants had a monopoly on the Chinese trade in Kobe from the start of the 
Meiji period (Murata 1898 pp.352-353). In addition, the composition of Chinese 
trade at that time included copper, marine products, Japanese tallow, agar, and 
camphor as the exports; the imports were sugar, raw cotton, and ginned cotton. 
This seems to show that primary products were exported to China, while light 
industrial products were imported from there. Afterwards, in the mid-Meiji period, 
the percentage of matches, cotton knitted goods, silk fabrics, and other light 
industrial goods bound for China grew, along with that of raw cotton imported 
from China. The raw cotton imports dropped dramatically after tariffs on raw 
cotton imports from India were scrapped; later, imports of soybeans and soybean 
meal rose, maintaining the trend of export and import growth between Kobe and 
China.
 In addition, trade between Kobe and Southeast and South Asia also began with 
Chinese merchants. According to Kobe Kaiko 30-nenshi, when many Chinese 
merchants returned home owing to the Sino-Japanese War, the attempt to revive 
the commercial rights between Kobe, Southeast Asia, and South Asia in the hands 
of Japanese merchants was used but had failed. As is clear from this failure, the 
mid-Meiji period was dominated by the Chinese merchants (Murata 1898 p.354).
 Afterwards, when a Sino-Japanese Trade Treaty was concluded in 1896 at the 
end of the Sino-Japanese War, there was a fundamental change in the composi-
tion of exports and imports in the Japanese-Chinese trade. Prior to the Sino-
Japanese War, primary products were a major component of exports and imports; 
after the war, exports of cotton products as an industrial product grew dramati-
cally, even as imports of primary products remained unchanged. The growth of 
cotton exports from Kobe owing to the rapid development of the modern textile 
industry in the Osaka-Kobe region was a reason for this. In addition, growing role 
projects and helping out (Suwaki 1998 p.69).
 7) With respect to copper exports, Japanese and German merchants gained market share 
during the latter half of the Meiji era, leading to a loss in market share for Chinese 
merchants. In particular, German merchants accounted for 60.6% of the copper exported 
from Kobe in 1911, and Japanese merchants accounted for 32.4%, so there was a duopoly 
(Nishimura 2014 p.1304). Despite the large impact of the fall in copper exports to China, it 
is clear that the role of Chinese merchants in copper exports diminished greatly. We believe 
this topic should be addressed in the future and should take into consideration the research 
on the Sumitomo Corporation, which operated the Besshi copper mine in Ehime Prefecture.
6of Kobe as the point of origin for regular shipping routes to China after the Sino-
Japanese War seems to be a reason for the increase in export of cotton from Kobe. 
Accordingly, the base of many Chinese merchants shifted from Kawaguchi, the 
treaty port in Osaka, to Kobe, and the expatriate Chinese community in Kobe 
grew. In addition, the lack of detailed figures that show the share of the Chinese 
merchants in Kobe’s overall trade at the time makes it difficult to identify the 
actual size of their businesses; in the case of powerful Chinese merchants that 
moved from Osaka, the trade of individuals from Fujian was mostly with 
Southeast Asia and South Asia, and that of individuals from Guangdong was 
primarily with Hong Kong. The trend was the same for Chinese merchants in 
Kobe, and resulted in their playing a major role in trade from Hong Kong to 
Southeast Asia and South Asia8).
 After the Russo-Japanese War, the proportion of trade with Northeast and 
North China grew dramatically as Japan moved formally into mainland China. 
With the increase in shipping routes, where Osaka was the origin for trade with 
Northeast and North China, the status of Osaka in the Chinese trade rose 
rapidly. In conjunction with this, the role of the Japan-China trade by Chinese 
merchants based in Kobe declined. This was not only because of the rapid 
strengthening of economic ties between Osaka and China, but also the aggressive 
expansion of Japanese general trading firms and shipping firms to mainland 
China with the support of the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Bank of Taiwan; 
they chose to handle the transactions that had previously depended on Chinese 
merchants themselves.
 Even so, the proportion of Chinese merchants in the overseas trade in Kobe 
was still large. For example, in 1930, Chinese merchants were responsible for 
approximately 53% of the total exports from Kobe to China (excluding North 
China and Northeast China), Hong Kong, Southeast Asia, and South Asia. This 
came to a halt as the disruption caused by the Sino-Japanese War of 1937 became 
apparent, and the proportion dropped to approximately 12% in 1938. The begin-
ning of the Pacific War strengthened trade controls, forcing a shrinkage in the 
independent commerce of Chinese merchants.
Section 3   The Work of Compradors Supporting Banking 
in Kobe
 The Yokohama Specie Bank and the Bank of Taiwan are examples of banks 
that employed compradors before the outbreak of the Pacific War. In 1937, the 
comprador for the Bank of Taiwan was a Lǐ Huītíng, while compradors for the 
 8) If we narrow the pool of Chinese merchants to those from Hakka-speaking provincial areas, 
we observe that the Dutch East Indies accounted for the largest proportion of trade with 
Kobe during the period extending from the early 20th century to the Second World War 
(Chin 2016 p.72-76).
7Yokohama Specie Bank were Wáng Chóngshān and Bào Yìjūn. As for compradors 
for the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (hereafter, ‘HSBC’), which 
had a central role in foreign trade financing, along with the Yokohama Specie 
Bank and the Bank of Taiwan from the start of the Meiji period, the father and 
son duo of Lán Zhuōfēng and Báqún carried out the duties from the mid-Meiji 
period to the Pacific War. Other than Wáng Chóngshān, who was from Fujian, all 
the above mentioned, compradors were from Guangdong.
 Much of the foreign trade by Chinese merchants based in Kobe used payment 
via documentary drafts; thus, from the standpoint of foreign exchange banks, 
trustworthy Chinese intermediaries were required to secure the safety of transac-
tions; this made the compradors indispensable. Compradors in Kobe banking were 
primarily responsible for cash accounting, besides endorsing and guaranteeing 
documentary drafts of Chinese merchant. Thus, while banks not involved in 
foreign exchange transactions, despite having a presence in Kobe, did not have 
compradors. The ratio of each type of work in the banks differed according to how 
each bank grew its business throughout Asia; in general, compradors of U.
K.-based foreign exchange banks (included in U.K.’ colonies -based foreign 
exchange banks), such as HSBC, had a relatively heavier involvement as interme-
diaries in the work between Chinese merchants in the Strait Settlements or Hong 
Kong, or that between Chinese merchants in the East Indies, which was governed 
by the Netherlands. In the case of Hong Kong-bound exports, most were paid 
through remittances, so cash accounting was the primary work of the U.K.-based 
foreign exchange banks. In contrast to Dutch foreign exchange banks, the 
Yokohama Specie Bank and the Bank of Taiwan were mainly involved in endorse-
ment and guarantees. In the case of the Yokohama Specie Bank, both Wáng 
Chóngshān and Bào Yìjūn ignored cash accounting, and involved themselves only 
in the endorsements and guarantees of drafts.
 At one time, according to Negishi, the bank comprador worked on: 1) intro-
ducing businesses profitable to the bank; 2) guaranteeing the soundness of trans-
actions that were profitable for the bank; 3) finance administration, and ensuring 
there were no issues with their work; and 4) gathering of information to ensure 
bank profit, or that an activity would not lead to a loss (Pu Lan 1966 pp.14-15). 
When citing these examples, we should keep in mind the compradors in Western 
financial institutions that expanded into Chinese banking; however, unlike the 
situation in mainland China, there was no need in Japan to incur costs to confirm 
the trustworthiness of the currencies and banknotes in circulation. Thus, the main 
work of bank compradors in Kobe was limited to either managing cash accounting 
or endorsing and guaranteeing exchange drafts drawn by Chinese merchants.
 In the business transactions between the Chinese merchants in Kobe and those 
in Hong Kong or other locations in Southeast Asia or East Asia, most payments 
were made with documentary bills of exchange with D/A (Documents against 
8Acceptance) terms9). In addition, payments to Japanese producers or distributors 
for exports from Kobe were primarily in cash, and most Chinese merchants 
cashed the documentary bills of exchange at the branches of the export destina-
tions or at the foreign exchange banks of their trading party. To keep the risk as 
low as possible, the transactions were often routed through compradors that guar-
anteed the documentary bills of exchange.
 In the case of HSBC, compradors reported to it the daily exchange rates 
announced by the Yokohama Specie Bank, and, accordingly set their own rates. 
HSBC compradors bought notes from the Chinese merchants with whom they did 
business on the information of the daily exchange rates; further, they endorsed 
and guaranteed them before submitting them to the bank. Depending on the 
note’s amount, they collected guarantee fees from both the bank and the Chinese 
merchants according to a set rate10). Compradors that bought notes in this manner 
gave them to the banks, who paid guarantee fees in a lump sum at the end of the 
month. In addition to facilitating primary trade exchanges in the form of docu-
mentary bills of exchange and clean bills of exchange between the world wars, 
HSBC made remittances by telegraph and mail. Of the documentary bills of 
exchange handled by both HSBC and the Yokohama Specie Bank, most were by 
Kobe compradors for exports from Kobe to Hong Kong or Southeast Asia. Thus, 
the primary work done by compradors in Kobe was endorsing and guaranteeing 
documentary bills of exchange drawn by Chinese merchants based in Kobe (Pu 
Lan 1966 pp.18-20).
 In addition to endorsing and guaranteeing notes, managing cash accounting 
was another important task performed by compradors. Outside of the Yokohama 
Specie Bank and the Bank of Taiwan, compradors were responsible for this func-
tion. Compradors were given space to do their work in the branch offices of banks 
in Kobe, and the compradors themselves hired trustworthy Chinese workers to do 
the cash accounting. Individuals hired by compradors were called ‘shroffs’, and 
HSBC had ten of them. HSBC also directly hired Chinese workers not employed 
by the compradors; the bank’s Kobe branch had many such employees. The actual 
work for HSBC compradors included transferring cash to the Bank of Japan’s 
Kobe branch; collecting notes that had come to term; accepting cash within the 
bank, managing keys to the vault; and working on all aspects of cash collection 
and expenditures. By comparison, in the Yokohama Specie Bank, which did not 
 9) The characteristics of trades between Kobe-based Chinese merchants and Chinese 
merchants based in Southeast Asia or South Asia (including Hong Kong) will be described 
later.
10) On the surface, it appeared that the bank did not question the credit risk of the bills of 
exchange brought in by the Chinese merchants. It appeared as though Chinese merchants 
were directly requesting the comprador for endorsements. However, Chinese merchants 
were directly requesting the comprador for personal endorsements, and then bringing their 
endorsed bills to the bank. The guarantee charge paid by the bank was deemed as the 
endorsement fee.
9entrust cash accounting to the compradors, the offices of compradors were outside 
the Kobe branch, and individuals hired in those offices had no involvement in the 
bank’s operations (Pu Lan 1966 pp.14-17).
 Comprador remuneration comprised a fixed salary from the bank, along with a 
variable component based on the amount of endorsements and guarantees of 
notes. For the fixed salary, compradors negotiated with the bank based on the 
wages of shroffs employed by compradors and the remuneration account for a 
small portion of their earnings. Given this, it is thought that banks employed 
directly not only individual compradors, but also about half their shroffs, and 
entrusted them with bank work. The fees tied to the amount of endorsements and 
guaranteeing of notes differed according to the amount guaranteed by the bank 
and types of customers; further, there were differences across banks.
 Taking HSBC as an example, we find that the guarantee fee for documentary 
bills of exchange was 0.125% of the face value; however, the fees are said to have 
varied from 0.0625% to 0.25% of the face value. The large variation was owing to 
the different levels of trustworthiness of the Chinese merchants drawing notes, 
and fluctuations in the global economy. The bank did not pay a guarantee fee for 
clean bills of exchange; and its fees were set at a high rate of 0.5% of face value 
because the bank and compradors were not interested in dealing with them. 
Compradors received 0.125% of the face value as a guarantee fee from the bank 
for remittances; because compradors at the Yokohama Specie Bank were not 
involved in cash accounting work, they could only get income from the endorse-
ment and guarantee of notes. Compradors of both banks generally demanded a 
marginal deposit from the importer when payments on documentary bills of 
exchange with D/A terms that they had guaranteed were past their due date11). 
Banks also generally requested a marginal deposit, primarily on the recommenda-
tion of the comprador (Pu Lan 1966 pp.17-18). This action, in itself, did not 
provide income to the comprador, but it was important in the sense that it 
lowered their risk. It was important for the bank because it ensured additional 
income.
 Based on the work done by compradors in foreign exchange banks in Kobe, we 
shall focus particularly on the Yokohama Specie Bank; in the next section, we 
discuss the 1930s — a period having some primary data sources.
Section 4   The Yokohama Specie Bank and Compradors 
in Kobe
 As mentioned earlier, the business carried out by Chinese merchants in Kobe 
can be characterised as that of commission agents involved in trade that was 
11) Here, a margin deposit refers to the security deposit made directly to the bank at a value 
corresponding to the bill. Chinese merchants, who brought in documentary bills, faced a 
delay in payments and had to maintain a line of credit.
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based on buying from overseas and acting as sales agents. According to Kakyo no 
Kenkyu, when Chinese merchants in Kobe took on the work of purchasing over-
seas goods, they quickly placed orders with distributors or producers; when a sale 
was made, they received a 2% commission on the F.O.B. price from the distribu-
tors or producers, besides taking 1% of the F.O.B. price from the overseas 
purchasing company (Kikakuin 1939 chap.9) In response to various demands from 
overseas firms, the Chinese merchants took on responsibility as middlemen, and 
themselves bore the associated costs. Because Chinese merchants had built trade 
relationships as the foundation for interpersonal relationships based fundamen-
tally on geographical or familial relationships, there was a need to avoid even 
short-term loss of trust in a transaction. Thus, when Chinese merchants in Kobe 
acted as middlemen for overseas Chinese merchants, the few documentary trans-
actions were mainly done with D/P (Documents against Payment) term notes, and 
the remaining with letters of credit. For example, when Chinese merchants based 
in Kobe exported products to Southeast Asia, they purchased products from Japan 
with yens, and, at the point of export, paid in the local currency, guilders, or 
Strait dollars. To do so, they converted assets in the local currency to yen at the 
foreign exchange bank with which they did business; they added this amount to 
their account with that bank. When using a documentary bill of exchange as the 
means of settlement in a transaction, they asked a comprador with whom the 
Chinese merchants did business in Kobe for an endorsement; next, either the 
comprador took the endorsed documentary bill of exchange to the foreign 
exchange bank, or the Chinese merchants themselves took it to their bank, which, 
in turn, sent the bill to a foreign exchange bank for settlement. In the latter half 
of the 1930s, using transactional banks as intermediaries became more common 
than asking compradors for endorsements; thus, transactions based on trust in 
individual compradors decreased, even in trade with Chinese merchants based in 
Kobe.
 Even so, the role of compradors in the various foreign exchange banks in 1930s 
trade in Kobe was relatively large. From the standpoint of foreign exchange banks 
in particular, having compradors as intermediaries was very important for 
lowering risk. Negishi once explained the role of compradors in foreign exchange 
banks as ‘being completely liable to banks for contracts not being executed, 
causing damage to banks’. Thus, when foreign exchange banks entered into agree-
ments to hire compradors, there was a need to explicitly detail comprador assets. 
Some transactions exceeded the total value of comprador assets; thus, while 
comprador transactions were not dependent on the size of their assets, one failed 
transaction could lead to insolvency. Hence, the work of compradors carried an 
exceedingly high risk. On the other hand, compradors were given a significant 
amount of trust by Chinese merchants in Kobe, as well as by the foreign exchange 
banks, and being a comprador was likely very useful for expanding one’s own 
business because of the practical work they did. Below, we further our examina-
tion with a focus on Wáng Chóngshān, who worked as a comprador for the 
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Yokohama Specie Bank in the late 1930s.
 Wáng Chóngshān followed his father, Wáng Jìngxiáng, to become a comprador 
for the Yokohama Specie Bank in 192212). Shortly after becoming a comprador, he 
took over for the work of Bào Yìjūn, who had been doing the work of Wáng’s 
father13). Guarantee amounts that were being paid since the time of Wáng 
Jìngxiáng were set, though separate marginal deposits were also demanded based 
on the amount of the transaction and special circumstances. In addition, as 
already noted earlier, when endorsed notes became unexercisable, compradors 
were required to submit additional collateral. For the Yokohama Specie Bank, the 
role of compradors, simply put, was to avoid risk that banks, with their internal 
knowledge, and by charging fees on transactions where profits were expected, 
found difficult to assume. The comprador, in contrast, was able to get substantial 
profit by taking on risk that the Yokohama Specie Bank did not want to take. 
Both parties were necessary for foreign trade in Kobe. In addition to compradors, 
there were exchange businesses that were responsible for the financing of Chinese 
merchants in Kobe; however, the role of these organisations was limited to the 
exchange of foreign currency14), and the transactions of Chinese merchants were 
done through banks that had a base in Kobe (Pu Lan 1966 pp.20-21).
 Looking at the area of origin of Chinese merchants with bases in Kobe, one 
finds that most were from Guangdong. Further, when trading with Hong Kong, 
there were many cases of bills of exchange not being used for cotton or silk from 
Kobe in particular; this was because the postal environment between Hong Kong 
and Kobe improved steadily, and cargo acceptance became easier with import 
destinations’ sustained acceptance bills of lading for short periods. Of course, 
exporting products other than cotton and silk to Hong Kong required a documen-
12) Jing-shiang Wang was born on Kinmon Island in Fujian province. He took over the family 
business, a trading company called Fusinhow established by his father, Ming-yu Wang, on 
Kinmen Island. Jing-shiang Wang successfully ran the business by building close relation-
ships with family members and relatives, as well as with his employees and other compa-
nies from the same province. Bo-lin Wang, the son of Chong-shan Wang, wrote a paper 
summarising the life histories of three generations of the Wang family; it included those of 
Ming-yu Wang, Jing-shiang Wang, and Chong-shan Wang (Wang 1990).
13) Fusinhow was primarily active in the import of soybeans and soybean meal from North 
China, and also traded with Southeast Asia. In 1909, Wang was appointed as the 
comprador of the Kobe branch of the Yokohama Specie Bank. He hired Yijun Bao as the 
manager to carry out the day-to-day transactions. Yijun Bao was previously the comprador 
of the Yokohama branch of the Chartered Bank of India, Australia, and China, but left for 
Kobe following his resignation; he was hired there by Jing-shiang Wang as a manager. 
Although Jing-shiang Wang was assigned the role of comprador for the Kobe branch of the 
Yokohama Specie Bank, he was not fully acquainted with the banking business. Thus, it 
was Yijun Bao who undertook the tasks of the comprador. During the opening of the 
Southeast Asia branch of the Yokohama Specie Bank, Yijun Bao travelled to the branch and 
contributed to the logistics involved in establishing it.
14) Some money-changing businesses in Kobe offered discounted bills and check cashing, but the 
details are unknown (Kanda 1938 p.277).
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tary bill of exchange.
 In the latter half of the 1930s, Chinese merchants in Kobe did business 
primarily with the Kobe Bank, the Jugo Bank, the Yasuda Bank, and the Nomura 
Bank; many bills of exchange handled by Chinese merchants were taken to these 
banks. Further, we have already noted that these bills were purchased from the 
merchants by the Yokohama Specie Bank. In addition, because the Yokohama 
Specie Bank itself did not buy notes directly on the endorsements and guarantees 
of compradors, most documentary bills of exchange of Chinese merchants in Kobe 
came to be handled by it. Outside of the Yokohama Specie Bank, other foreign 
exchange banks employed compradors and carried out a similar service; however, 
because many of them tended to avoid yen-based capital management so the 
handling of documentary bills of exchange was concentrated in the Yokohama 
Specie Bank. As has already been noted, many documentary bills of exchange 
drawn by Chinese merchants had D/A terms, and most had payment dates of 45 
days after listing. These banks charged fees or guarantee fees of 0.375 yen per 
100 yen when purchasing notes, and, in many cases, merchants drawing the bills 
added the fees to the initial payment amount (Kanda 1938 p.276).
Section 5   Wáng Chóngshān and the Yokohama Specie 
Bank
 We have already mentioned that Wáng Jìngxiáng began working as a 
comprador at the Yokohama Specie Bank alongside Bào Yìjūn in 1909. Because 
there are almost no primary materials that describe the type of work he actually 
did, we have no way to analyse his work in detail. The Hyogo Museum of History 
at Himeji in Hyogo prefecture was handed Wáng’s Jìngxiáng private documents; 
however, because there is nothing among them related to his work as a comprador 
in the Yokohama Specie Bank, it is difficult to directly ascertain the details of his 
work. In addition, most of the primary material from the Yokohama Specie Bank 
was destroyed by the Great Kanto Earthquake in 1923 and the bombings during 
the Pacific War, leaving behind almost no documents on Wáng’s work at the bank. 
It is currently difficult to research Wáng’s activities using primary sources. 
Fortunately, there are some primary sources of the Yokohama Specie Bank that 
were sealed off from the 1930s to the end of the second world war; these include 
reports related to the bank’s Kobe branch in the latter half of the 1930s. These 
are stored in the archives of the library of the faculty of the economics of the 
University of Tokyo. Some of these documents are published as microfilms by 
Maruzen, and this paper references documents related to the Yokohama Specie 
Bank on microfilm.
 There are very few mentions of Wáng Jìngxiáng in the primary sources from 
the Yokohama Specie Bank. Among them is a report dated April 30, 1919 from 
the manager of the Kobe branch to the main office; it lists transaction amounts. 
According to this report, Wáng endorsed and guaranteed notes worth 2.5 million 
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yen; of this, 1.1 million yen was for exports to Java, and the remaining amount 
was for exports to Manila. The manager was concerned that, while exports to 
Singapore were relatively stable, notes for Java exports included some that were 
faulty; this led the manager to express mistrust towards Wáng, who had endorsed 
and guaranteed them. The manager actually argued for a gradual reduction in the 
percentage of transactions handled by Wáng.
 After Wáng Jìngxiáng died in 1922 and the comprador work at the Yokohama 
Specie Bank was handed over, the notes of Chinese merchants endorsed and guar-
anteed by Wáng Chóngshān, as of September 30, 1926, included notes worth: 
17,765 yen with D/P terms, and 1,678,796 yen with D/A terms, giving a total 
amount of 1,696,582 yen. Additional collateral for these was 93,860 yen, and in 
many transactions the Yokohama Specie Bank demanded a marginal deposit from 
Wáng Chóngshān. Of the transactions from the previous year, the highest 
amounts were 16,788 yen for notes with D/P terms, and 2,119,597 yen for notes 
with D/A terms; notes with clean terms (i.e. those with no bill of lading) were 987 
yen, giving a total of 2,137,375 yen. The report from the Kobe branch manager to 
the home office in 1926 pointed out that these figures were lower than those in 
the Wáng Jìngxiáng era. Without figures, it is difficult to determine whether this 
reduction was because of transactions of a lower amounts or a reduced role for 
Wáng Chóngshān in the purchase of notes drawn by Chinese merchants; however, 
it is certain that the Yokohama Specie Bank diversified its means of settlement 
with the Chinese merchants engaged in overseas trade in Kobe.
 However, we note that no point of concern related to the notes endorsed and 
guaranteed by Wáng Chóngshān can be found in the 1926 report. As a backdrop 
to the fall in amounts transacted by Wáng Chóngshān, one should consider the 
aggressive purchase of notes from Chinese merchants by the Bank of Taiwan and 
other foreign exchange banks; specifically, the De Javasche Bank, Deutsch-
Asiatische Bank, and HSBC had garnered approximately 20% of Chinese 
merchants notes that were previously handled by the Yokohama Specie Bank. In 
addition, an inspection section manager named Ono (Ono is his family name. His 
first name is not written in this manuscript), who inspected the Kobe branch’s 
operations, had already stated his private opinion to the home office that notes 
purchased with the endorsement and guarantee of Wáng Chóngshān should be 
capped at million yen; however, he points out that this would reduce the transac-
tion amounts.
 In the mid-1930s, the amounts of notes purchased by banks began to match the 
those purchased after endorsement and guarantee by Wáng Chóngshān (see Table 
1). The aforementioned banks (including the post-merger banks), along with 
Sumitomo Bank, endorsed notes most frequently, and the transaction amounts of 
the zaibatsu banks, such as Mitsui Bank and Mitsubishi Bank, with the 
Yokohama Specie Bank was small.
 In addition, many Chinese merchants that wanted the Yokohama Specie Bank 
to settle the notes operated large fix deposits there. If there were some issues with 
14
the notes they took to the bank, such accounts could serve as collateral for the 
bank; further, the accounts also acted as interest-paying collateral if interest-
bearing notes15) were drawn. This shows that the Yokohama Specie Bank was 
diversifying its risk and not depending entirely on Wáng Chóngshān. Of course, it 
also means that the Chinese merchants had gained the trust of the Yokohama 
Specie Bank after opening accounts there.
 It goes without saying that Wáng Chóngshān and Bào Yìjūn also had fix 
deposit accounts, and these compradors had separately pledged real estate and 
personal guarantee deposits. Wáng Chóngshān actually paid 52,000 yen as a 
personal guarantee, and Bào Yìjūnalso had real estate worth an appraised value 
of 29,969 yen pledged to the Yokoyama Specie Bank. In addition to these deposits, 
the Yokohama Specie Bank financed a large sum for the Fùxīng-hào; this resulted 
in the bank and Wáng Chóngshān forging close ties.
 Next, we shall examine the remitters by region. When we first view the 
percentage of foreign trade in Kobe in the latter part of the 1930s, we see that 
trade with the U.S. and British India was large; this was followed by a relatively 
smaller amount of trade with Southeast Asia. The balance of interest-bearing 
notes endorsed and guaranteed by Wáng Chóngshān, at the end of December 
1940, showed that among notes with D/A terms, notes for Batavia-bound exports 
were worth 662,231 yen; those related to Surabaya trade were worth 275,208 yen; 
and Samaran had notes worth 72,497 yen. These three cities in the Dutch East 
Indies accounted 98.3% of the overall notes and occupied the top three spots 
among cities. Among notes with D/P terms, Hong Kong-bound exports were worth 
56,775 yen, and those related to Tianjin were worth 37,122 yen, accounting for 
45.2% and 29.6%, respectively, of the total. As we have already noted, a factor in 
this was the stable postal environment between Hong Kong and Kobe, and 
perhaps the same could be said for that between Tianjin and Kobe (see Table 2).
 Moreover, Table 3 shows the destination countries for the export-related notes 
taken to the Yokohama Specie Bank, as well as the Chinese merchants that drew 
the notes. This table shows that the notes endorsed and guaranteed by Wáng 
Chóngshān included those for Dérénhé (434,500 yen), Dōngnán Gōngsī (632,470), 
and Huádōng Gōngsī (273,100 yen), these were the top three and, between them, 
accounted for 63.1% of notes endorsed and guaranteed by Wáng Chóngshān. Of 
these, with the exception of notes worth 2,217 yen from Dōngnán Gōngsī, most 
(82.9%) were for the Dutch East Indies and had D/A terms (the total amounts of 
notes from these four merchants endorsed and guaranteed by Wáng Chóngshān 
was 1,570,347 yen). Based on this, we can infer that notes purchased by the 
Yokohama Specie Bank and endorsed and guaranteed by Wáng Chóngshān were 
15) In addition to the face value of a bill, some types of bills pay the interest earned during the 
period between the issue and maturity dates. This is applicable only to bills of exchange 
payable at sight or a fixed time after the sight. The bill of exchange must specify the 
interest terms and the interest rate.
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tied to the Dutch East Indies. In examining why such a regional skew occurred, 
Chén Láixìng has pointed out the role of the network of geographical and familial 
ties among Chinese merchants based in Kobe (Chin 2016 pp.72-76).
 To reiterate, most of the Wáng Chóngshān-endorsed and guaranteed notes 
were for trade with Hong Kong and Tianjin, where the postal environment was 
safe, and had D/P terms; those for most of the other regions had D/A terms. 
Among these, Wáng Chóngshān was most involved in transactions with D/A term 
notes for export to the Dutch East Indies, where he had a network. No relation-
ship can be found between this and the management policies of the Yokohama 
Specie Bank, and, in the end, it came down to the individual judgment of Wáng. 
So, why did the Yokohama Specie Bank allow this bias in the handling of notes? 
The answer lies in the long-term trust-based relationships between Wáng and the 
Chinese community in Kobe. Additionally, the value of notes brought from other 
banks increased; this perhaps made the Yokohama Specie Bank wary of harming 
its relationship by expressing opinions on the work done by Wáng.
Future Topics
 Chinese merchants played a significant role in the overseas trade in Kobe from 
the Meiji period onwards. In particular, from the start to the middle of the Meiji 
period, Japanese merchants could not compete with their Chinese counterparts. 
Compared with the opening of the Yokohama port to the West, the end of the Edo 
period and the opening of ports can be considered as an opening to Asia. This 
resulted in Chinese merchants visiting Kobe at an early date; steadily expanding 
their businesses; and contributing to the growth of Kobe in a way unlike that in 
Yokohama. For the Osaka-Kobe region, which had developed modern industries, 
such as textiles, Kobe was a port for importing cotton and other raw materials, 
and developed as a port exporting silk and cotton fabrics, as well as other miscel-
laneous items. Chinese merchants played a central role in this development.
 As foreign trade expanded, Kobe was also forced to strengthen ties with East 
Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia; to do so, it relied on the knowhow of 
Chinese merchants and their close-knit trade relationships. General trading 
companies emerged in Japan to compete with the knowhow and networks of 
Chinese merchants; even so, it was difficult to completely shake off their depen-
dence on the Chinese merchants’ networks prior to the Pacific War. Although the 
Japanese companies succeeded in expanding trade with Asia without relying on 
Chinese merchants, the Chinese merchant knowhow and networks posed a stiff 
challenge. This is best seen in the example of the compradors, and the Yokohama 
Specie Bank is a striking example of the need to rely on highly trustworthy 
merchants, such as Wáng Chóngshān, in the Chinese community of Kobe. 
However, there has not been a satisfactory empirical analysis of the role of these 
compradors.
 This paper is an attempt to identify the extent of the role of Chinese compra-
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dors in Kobe; it does so by analysing descriptions and figures related to Wáng 
Chóngshān in the primary sources of the Yokohama Specie Bank. However, there 
has not been a sufficient exploration of the activities of a number of: other 
Japanese banks operating in Kobe; shipping companies, such as Nippon Yusen; 
foreign exchange banks from overseas; and trading companies who also employed 
compradors. How Chinese merchants actually worked as compradors is a topic left 
for a future study; clarification on this topic can help in identifying how the 
network of Chinese merchants that traded throughout Asia, and foreign exchange 
banks, such as HSBC and the Yokohama Specie Bank, formed relationships; in 
other words, it would throw light on the state of trade financing that supported 
trade in Asia. An empirical analysis of compradors can provide many insights 
regarding concrete business relationships between Western and Chinese 
merchants; these have not been fully explored in the economic history of modern 
Asia.
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Table 1
The Purchased Amount of Chinese Merchants’ Bills endorsed  
by Wáng Chóngshān and Banks  (Yen)
1934.6 1934.12 1935.6 1935.12
Bills endorsed and guaranteed 
by Wáng Chóngshān
6,516,924 7,337,681 5,947,815 6,495,984
Bills endorsed by Banks 10,851,452 9,187,421 7,151,724 7,066,735
TOTAL 17,368,376 16,525,102 13,099,539 13,562,719
(source) Microfilms of the Yokohama Specie Bank Archives
Table 2
The Client Ledger Balance of Interest-Bearing Notes Guaranteed  
by Wáng Chóngshān  (Yen) 31st December 1940
Destination Amount
Breakdown
D/P D/A CLEAN
HONG KONG 74,035 56,775 17,260 0
TIENTSIN 46,231 37,122 0 9,109
BATAVIA 673,128 10,894 662,231 0
SEMARANG 72,497 0 72,497 0
SURABAYA 294,089 18,880 275,208 0
OTHERS 1,818 1,818 0 0
TOTAL 1,161,798 125,489 1,027,196 9,109
(source) Microfilms of the Yokohama Specie Bank Archives
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